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I. Introduction and Overview: Ten Strategic Questions
The strategy of the Zedillo Administration for the reduction of poverty relied on both
broad-based social expenditures and targeted poverty programs (Figures 1 and 2).
Broad-based social expenditures are devoted to the areas of social security and health-
care, education, job training, and housing. Targeted poverty programs focus on
investing in the human capital of the poor, promoting income and employment
opportunities for the poor, and improving the physical infrastructure of poor areas.
Public funding for targeted programs has increased much faster over the last dozen
years than the programmable budget (Figure 3). Within targeted spending (MXP$53
billion in 2000), half of the funds are devoted to human capital, a third to physical
infrastructure, and the rest to income opportunities (Figure 4). This Chapter is based
on the poverty assessment for Mexico completed by the World Bank.1 It evaluates the
impact of government programs and policies on poverty. After summarizing the key
findings through 10 strategic questions, the Chapter reviews broad-based social
expenditure and government programs targeted to the poor.
II. Key Findings
1. Do The Poor Benefit From Broad-Based Expenditures In Health, Education,
Training, And Housing? The poor do benefit from these broad-based public expen-
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1. Especially the Executive Summary and Chapters 2 to 5 in “Government Programs and
Poverty in Mexico,” Report No. 19214-ME, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1999, 2
volumes. The report contains a detailed bibliography which is not reproduced here.
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Figure 1. Broad-based and Targeted Policies
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Source: Budget of the government of Mexico (federal level).
Figure 2. Targeted Policies by Group
Targeted
Policies
Development of
Human Capital
• Program for Education, Health and
Nourishment, PROGRESA
• Food programs: school breakfasts, 
rationing of milk and tortillas, 
other programs
• Health programs: Program for Expansion
of Coverage under IMSS-Solidaridad
• Compensatory Education programs
• Social Security for IMSS agricultural
laborers
Development of
Physical Capital
Employment and
Income
Opportunities
• Seasonal employment program
• Productive supports for low-wage
Sagar agricultural workers
• Productive supports from the National
Indigenous Institute
• National Fund for Support of Social
Enterprises
• Development of basic social infrastructure
in marginalized areas
• Drinking water and sanitation in 
marginalized areas
• Rural roads and telephony
Source: Budget of the government of Mexico (federal level).
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Figure 3. Resources Channeled by Poverty Alleviation Programs
(millions of pesos of 2000)
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Figure 4. Government Spending for Poverty Alleviation
(2000 pesos in billions)
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ditures, but not enough. Incidence analysis demonstrates a highly unequal distribu-
tion of upper secondary and university education. Beyond formal basic education,
the access of the poor to training remains limited. Those working in the informal sec-
tor (almost half the population) lack health insurance, and until recently 10 million
people did not have access to healthcare. In low-income housing, there is evidence of
leakage to the nonpoor of programs in principle devoted to low-wage workers. The
increase in social spending observed in the last 10 years will be good news for the
poor only to the extent that they are better able to benefit from these expenditures.
2. Are There Other Broad-Based Expenditures Where Adjustments Would Help
to Serve the Poor? While the government considers broad-based expenditures in
health, education, training, and housing to be part of its strategy for the alleviation
of poverty, it does not include in this strategy a number of other large programs
which have, or could have, an impact on poverty. PROCEDE may be beneficial for
the communities adopting it. This is also the case of the agriculture programs
PROCAMPO and Alianza para el Campo. This Chapter indicates that PRO-
CAMPO may have a larger impact on poverty than Alianza para el Campo, but
additional work is needed to evaluate Alianza para el Cambio’s subprograms using
better data. PROCAMPO payments would have an even greater impact if payments
were progressive, so that those having less land would receive more support per
hectare. The point is that a comprehensive strategy for the alleviation of poverty can-
not rest solely on a small number of targeted programs. It is important to make sure
that, wherever feasible, the design of these programs are adapted so that their impact
on the poor is magnified, even though the programs are not specifically targeted to
the poor. (Of course, in helping the poor to benefit from the programs, it must be
ensured that no conflicts arise with the objectives of the programs.)
3. Is PROGRESA Functioning Well? PROGRESA provides integrated support at
the household level for education, health, and nutrition. An in-depth evaluation of
the program has been implemented by PROGRESA staff together with the Inter-
national Food Policy Research Institute, IFPRI. Overall the program is well thought
out and innovative. Yet, in a number of areas, it may be worthwhile to think of
potential adjustments in the program. PROGRESA’s targeting system may not have
always been successful in identifying the needy. Its use of cash grants is appropriate,
but the level of the grants may be high. PROGRESA is succeeding in raising the
demand for schooling and healthcare, but this generates tensions on the supply side
(steps have been taken to improve the coordination with supply-side initiatives).
PROGRESA is apparently empowering women in rural areas, but more time is
needed to judge its impact. Community participation, including in the selection of
program beneficiaries, could be promoted more vigorously. Rather than considering
the program’s current mix as ideal, PROGRESA staff may want to test how similar
or better results could be achieved at lower costs. Finally, in operational terms,
progress can be made to increase the efficiency of the program, for example through
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better supervision, the integration of the various data bases created by the program,
the potential use of the banking system for the payment of the stipends, etc.
4. Was It Right to Reorganize Food Subsidies? While the now-defunct generalized
subsidy on tortilla did reduce inequality, especially in urban areas, and while it did
reduce inequality more than subsidies on utilities such as water and electricity, it cre-
ated distortions. It was also costly, it did not help the poor in the long term, and it
was biased toward urban areas. The decision to phase out this subsidy was appro-
priate. Should means-tested food subsidies be cut as well? This is a more difficult
question because the LICONSA (subsidized milk) and TORTIBONO (means-
tested tortilla subsidy) programs have larger impacts on poverty and inequality than
generalized subsidies. Still, despite their potential impact on nutrition, it remains
true that subsidies may not yield long-term benefits for the poor comparable to the
benefits provided by PROGRESA (or DIF’s school breakfasts), which apparently
helps in keeping children in school. More generally, given the wide array of food and
cash programs in Mexico, it would be important in further work to provide cost-
benefit analyses of the performance of the various programs, which would go
beyond the impact evaluations provided in this Chapter. For this, the results of sur-
vey-based impact evaluations should be combined with detailed administrative
records on costs and outreach.
5. Do Compensatory Education Programs Increase the Quality of Basic Education
for the Poor? While PROGRESA and DIF’s school breakfasts increase the demand
for schooling, compensatory education programs aim at improving the quality and
the supply of schooling. PARE was until recently one of the main programs provid-
ing resources for schools and training for teachers. While PARE’s overall impact on
test scores in sixth grade was found to be positive, the program did not improve the
test scores of the poorest indigenous children. Within nonindigenous rural schools,
the impact was also found to be positive, but lower for the poorest of the poor. In
urban areas, the impact was negative. Some of these results have to be considered
with caution due to the limits of the data available for evaluating PARE. Still, while
supply-side interventions can have substantial effects on the learning achievement of
children in poor areas, greater attention needs to be paid to the poorest and the
indigenous so that they too may benefit.
6. Is the Temporary Employment Program (PET) Cost-Effective in Transferring
Income to the Poor? PET provides off-season temporary employment in marginal-
ized rural areas. Because the wage is below the minimum wage, the program is self-
targeted. Household data indicate that program participants do need PET more
than nonparticipants because they do not have access to occupations providing work
all year long. Within participating communities, PET participants were also found
to be poorer than nonparticipants. Yet there are indications that PET may not reach
the smallest and most isolated rural communities. Rough appraisal methods indicate
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that the cost of generating 1 peso of additional income for the poor through PET is
about 3.5 pesos (this does not take into account the benefits from PET’s infrastruc-
ture works). Overall, PET is a necessary program that helps the rural poor, but its
design could be improved by learning from other experiences. In Argentina, for
example, Trabajar’s recent reform increased community participation and funding.
Local community groups present projects for selection by Trabajar staff. After
checking for technical feasibility, the projects are selected on a points basis, with
more points awarded to projects that are located in poorer areas and that yield larger
public benefits, benefit from well-regarded sponsoring groups, and reduce labor
costs below the minimum wage.
7. Do Small Rural Communities Have Access to Social Infrastructure? If Not,
What Can Be Done? This Chapter shows that access to governmental services (such
as telesecondary) and programs (such as DIF’s school breakfast) improve the human
capital of the poor by increasing the probability that children remain in school.
Unfortunately, households living in poor rural areas still lack access to basic social
infrastructure. Many communities with less than 20 households do not have elec-
tricity, health, and education services. The smaller the community, the smaller the
likelihood of benefiting from government programs as well. This does not imply
that government services and programs should be implemented everywhere. Due to
the high cost of reaching small rural communities, hard choices must be made as to
which communities to serve with which services and programs. A detailed cost-ben-
efit analysis of the tradeoffs should be conducted, taking into account the impact of
government interventions on mobility and migration. Work should also be done on
the impact of migration on poverty.
8. What Can Be Done to Ensure That the Decentralization Process Is Pro-poor?
Funds for new social infrastructure (FAIS) are now distributed according to a need
based formula. This has helped the poorest states increase their share of transfers.
The FAIS allocation formula could be improved in theory, but this would probably
not make a large difference because the various indicators on which the formula is
based are highly correlated. More problematic are the allocations for basic education
(FAEB) and health (FASSA), both of which account for three fourths of Ramo 33’s
budget. These allocations are not based on need, but on past expenditures and exist-
ing costs. Hence states that are already well endowed continue to receive more
funds. Without putting in jeopardy the maintenance and operation of existing infra-
structure, alternative ways to disburse these funds should be examined. At another
level, Mexico’s decentralization took place so rapidly that local governments have
not had time to fully adapt, and number of management and administrative issues
remain outstanding. The provision of training to local governments should alleviate
these concerns. Finally, international experience suggests that there may be a risk
with devolution, in that local levels of government may reduce social spending in
order to compete for (or simply please) wealthier residents. Federal and civil society
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controls may be needed to prevent this and to protect the poor, but these controls
should not prevent innovation at the local level.
9. Has the Government Improved the Design of Its Strategy for the Alleviation
of Poverty? The government has made some progress in the design of its strategy
for the alleviation of poverty, which was very much needed after the 1995 crisis.
As explained earlier, the decision to cut generalized food subsidies was correct.
Although reforms could be undertaken for improving each of the government’s
programs, and although more work could be conducted to optimize the relative
weights of the programs in the budget, the three-pronged strategy of the govern-
ment (investments in human capital, providing income and employment oppor-
tunities, and investments in poor areas) is fundamentally sound. Moreover, a cul-
ture of evaluation of the programs is progressively being developed, as exemplified
by the large-scale evaluation of PROGRESA undertaken by IFPRI, to be com-
pleted in 2000. Another example of the culture of evaluation taking shape is the
publication of the rules of operation of 135 programs in the Diario Oficial de la
Federación. Further gains could be achieved by evaluating programs in a consistent
cost-benefit framework, and by streamlining programs that do not have a clear
comparative advantage.
10. What Is Still Missing from the Government’s Strategy for the Alleviation of
Poverty? Two things: First, there may not yet be a clear blueprint for urban areas
similar to the one being implemented in rural areas. Following the phasing out of
generalized food subsidies and the implementation of PROGRESA, rural areas are
now benefiting from 75 percent of all expenditures targeted to the extreme poor.
Given the comparative levels of extreme poverty in urban and rural areas as meas-
ured in the surveys, the pro-rural bias of targeted programs for poverty is sound.
Still, in urban areas, even though the government is implementing new programs,
more is needed to have a clear vision of what has to be done for the extreme poor.
Second, at the national level, despite substantial progress in defining a strategy for
poverty reduction, there may not yet be a clear understanding of how broad-based
and targeted interventions may build on each other so that the whole is greater than
the sum of the parts.
The objective of the Bank Report on which this Chapter is based was limited to
providing elements for an evaluation of selected programs used by the government
for poverty reduction. Further work will be needed to ensure that all these programs
feed into a coherent strategy. The following areas for further work have been iden-
tified as potential inputs for an overall poverty reduction strategy: (a) geographic
dispersion in rural areas, basic infrastructure, and the impact of migration on
poverty; (b) evaluation of microcredit programs in rural areas; (c) more detailed eval-
uation of the PET program; (d) more detailed evaluation of PROBECAT to
improve the training component; and (e) poverty in urban areas, including the
reform of social security.
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III. Broad-Based Public Expenditures and Poverty
Within broad-based public expenditures, social and agricultural expenditures are
among the most important for the poor. Expenditures for education, health, social
security, job training, and housing are part of the government’s strategy for the
reduction of poverty. In 2000 social expenditures2 will account for 9.6 percent of
GDP and 61 percent of its programmable expenditures, compared to 6 percent and
36 percent, respectively, in 1990. As a result, over the last sexenio (between 1994
and 2000), despite a fall in real terms of programmable spending of 5.3 percent,
social spending per capita increased by 12.8 percent. About US$500 is now spent in
social expenditures per capita. This is almost a third of the resources needed for a
family of four to avoid being in extreme poverty. Apart from social expenditures,
spending by other Ministries also matter for the poor. The programs of SAGAR are
especially important given the high incidence of poverty in rural areas. This section
analyzes whether broad-based social expenditures benefit the poor, and evaluates the
impact on poverty of broad-based agricultural expenditures.
Access of the Poor to Broad-Based Social Public Expenditures Remains Limited
Education
In addition to improving access to upper secondary and higher levels of education,
improving basic education is a priority for the poor. As indicated in Figure 5 (next
page), which provides concentration curves for public school enrollment in 1996,
the access of the poor to upper secondary and university education remains limited,
compared to primary and lower secondary schooling (both of which are mandatory,
the latter since 1983). For the poor, apart from access to higher levels of education,
improving the quality of primary education and access to lower secondary educa-
tion, which together form the basic education track, are priorities. Interventions on
both the demand and supply side will be needed for this (see Section IV of this
Chapter, Investments in the Human Capital of the Poor). Some resources allocated
to universities could benefit the poor more if they were reallocated to improving the
quality of basic education (and also encouraging access in marginalized rural areas.)
Early Child Development (ECD) programs targeted to the poor tend to be effec-
tive in helping poor children succeed later in school. There is an international body
of evidence suggesting that ECD programs (preschool combined with nutrition
support) can be effective in avoiding malnutrition and in helping children learn. As
noted in the Education Chapter, Mexico’s Initial Education Program (PRODEI),
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with a per capita cost of about MXP50 per year, is a home-based program delivered
by community educators who train parents to stimulate their children. The parents’
education is developed through periodic group meetings supplemented by home vis-
its. The program promotes the physical, emotional, intellectual, and social develop-
ment of infants and toddlers, and improves the school-readiness skills of children.
There is empirical evidence that the program is effective in increasing returns on pri-
mary education. The program also creates job opportunities for young graduates (of
primary education) in poor areas. The program also increases women’s self-esteem,
and provides opportunities for parents to socialize, thereby fostering community
development. PRODEI’s coverage should be extended.
Mexico has increased enrollment and reduced dropout and repetition rates in pri-
mary schools. The government provides primary education to 14.5 million children,
95 percent of whom are enrolled in mainstream general primary education. The
official age of entry into primary school is 6, and this level of schooling should be
completed within 6 years. Due to latecomers and repetition, however, the target
population goes from ages 6 to 14. The percentage of all children aged 6 to 14
enrolled in primary school increased between the 1990 Census and the 1995 Con-
teo. The increase in primary school enrollment has been especially strong for the
indigenous population (an additional 170,000 students, or 30 percent) and for 6
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Figure 5. Concentration Curves for Enrollment by Education Level, 1996,
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year-olds, which suggests a better ability to attract children early on. However, the
fact that enrollment rates are higher for 7 to 11 year-olds indicates persistent prob-
lems related to latecomers and repetition rates. The number of schools and teachers
has increased faster than the number of students. While this is good for quality
improvements, it also induces higher costs. Mexico has also made progress in termi-
nal efficiency (ratio of the number of children completing sixth grade to new enroll-
ments in first grade 6 years earlier), with an 11-percentage-point gain in 5 years. The
increase in terminal efficiency is due to improvements in both dropout and repeti-
tion rates, which decreased for all grades. On average, dropouts decreased from 4.6
percent to 3.0 percent from 1991–92 to 1995–96, whereas repetition rates were
reduced from 9.8 percent to 7.8 percent. Overall, the number of children complet-
ing primary school each year has increased by more than 200,000. Still, while com-
pletion rates for primary education have reached 85 percent or more overall, they
are much lower for the poorest deciles of the population.
While progress has also been achieved in secondary schools, access is far from
universal. The lower secondary cycle lasts three years and is intended for age group
12 to 16. Today, 4.3 million students participate. Progress in the 1990s is demon-
strated by the following indicators: (a) enrollment has risen by 14.8 percent, trans-
lating into an additional 600,000 students; (b) as for primary schools, the number
of schools and to a lesser extent the number of teachers has increased faster than the
number of students (plus 26.9 percent for schools and 17.5 percent for teachers);
and (c) although still low, the enrollment rate in the age group 13 to 15 has gained
7 percentage points, reaching 75.4 percent in the 1996–97 school year. On the other
hand, terminal efficiency rates have not improved beyond 75 percent and the aver-
age dropout rate was 8.9 percent in 1997–98, which is much higher than the
dropout rate for primary education (2.9 percent), and only half a point lower than
the 9.5 percent dropout rate for secondary school in 1990–91.
Similarly, the repetition rate for lower secondary education has remained stable,
compared to a decrease for primary school. Factors both internal and external to the
school system are affecting the performance of lower secondary schools. Internally,
there may be a shortage of well-trained teachers, with a higher percentage of teach-
ers lacking appropriate training at the lower secondary than at the primary level.
Externally, the need for children to work, especially among the poorest families, may
contribute to generating high student absenteeism and poor test scores, which leads
to increased repetition.
Beyond formal basic education, the access of the poor to job training remains
limited. According to information from the ENE–ENECE 1997, the poor lack
access to training programs. As indicated in Figure 6, the distribution of training
courses is as unequal as that of income. While the distribution of training hours is
less unequal, it is still biased toward the better off. Among the poorest 10 percent of
the population, only 1.45 percent have participated in a training course in the last
three years. Among the richest 10 percent, the participation rate is 32 percent. Pub-
lic training is distributed more equally than private training, but it still favors the
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upper deciles. Moreover, while 49 percent of those in the poorest decile who get
training pay some or all of the cost of their training, only 25 percent of the rich pay
for their training. This is due to the fact that many of the poorest are unemployed
and cannot benefit from employer training. In the poorest decile, of all those who
get training, only one in six gets training on the employer’s premises, compared to
more than half in outside institutions. Among the wealthiest decile, 60 percent of
those getting training receive it at their firm, and only one third take training at
another institution.
Health
Despite progress in health, half the population remains uninsured and one tenth is
without access to healthcare. Infant mortality decreased in the 1990s, immunization
among children has become nearly universal, and some gains have been achieved in
maternal mortality. Life expectancy has increased from 66.8 years in 1980 to 71.7
years in 1996. However, despite such progress, and while the population engaged in
the formal labor market benefits from health insurance through IMSS and ISSSTE,
the informal sector (43 million adults and children) remains largely uninsured. Until
recently, within the informal sector, 60 percent of the population relied on services
provided by the SSA, 16 percent relied on IMSS-Solidaridad, and 24 percent had
almost no access to healthcare and needs to be covered.
• IMSS-Solidaridad. Begun in 1973, IMSS-Solidaridad extends Social Security
health coverage to segments of the population that are unable to pay into the
social security system. The goals are to improve the access to, and quality of,
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Figure 6. Distribution of Income, Training Courses, and Hours of Training
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medical attention for the poor. The program emphasizes reproductive health,
nutrition, and sanitation. The mobilization of local communities is an inte-
gral part of the program. A general assembly, a health committee, and groups
of volunteers are convened locally to help implement the program. As of
1996, the program served about 10 million people in 1,225 municipalities,
and it had built 3,540 clinics and 67 hospitals in marginalized areas.
• PAC. PAC (Programa de Ampliación de Cobertura) provides basic healthcare to
those living in marginalized and remote rural areas in coordination with
PROGRESA (which is discussed in Section IV of this Chapter). PAC is
expected to provide health services to 8 million people by 2000.
Social security reform was enacted in 1997 to ensure the continued financial and
institutional viability of IMSS in the face of the challenges posed by a growing and
aging population. While the expansion of the economy and the reform of social
security should help provide insurance to a larger share of the population, reaching
in a cost-effective manner those who fall outside of the system, particularly those liv-
ing in remote areas, will be a challenge, given the overall increase in the cost of
healthcare.
For the rural poor, the priority is access to a basic package of preventive and cur-
ative healthcare. Extreme poverty brings with it a high level of mortality and mor-
bidity. In rural areas, the infant mortality rate among the poor is more than twice
that among the nonpoor. The participation rates among the poor in family planning
and prenatal care are low. While 72 percent of poor rural women say they do not
want another pregnancy, less than 56 percent use any sort of birth control. Once
pregnant, 1 in 6 poor women in rural areas do not receive any prenatal care. Many
factors account for these problems, including lack of access to quality care,
unhealthy living conditions, malnutrition, lack of a culture of preventive health,
absence of social security benefits, and geographic dispersion. To help the poor, pro-
grams such as PAC put the priority on providing a package of basic care. For PAC,
this includes the following elements: accident prevention and emergency care; basic
sanitation; diarrhea control; family planning; treatment of parasitic diseases; health
information, communication, and education; immunization; prenatal and delivery
care; prevention and control of hypertension and diabetes mellitus; prevention and
control of tuberculosis, nutrition surveillance; treatment of upper respiratory tract
infections; and prevention and control of cervical cancer. This type of basic care
package emphasizes prevention, but curative services are also being tested and devel-
oped, including mobile surgery units.
Housing
Social interest housing programs are not efficient, and they are not accessible to the
very poor. Apart from new and small pilot programs, the contribution of the gov-
ernment to the social interest housing sector consists of two agencies facilitating
ownership: FOVISSSTE for public sector workers, and INFONAVIT for private
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sector workers (FOVI is also active in the sector). The management difficulties
encountered by these agencies have been documented (also see the Chapter on
Housing). In addition, the problem for the very poor is that they are not eligible for
mortgages, and therefore cannot benefit from the programs. Moreover, while these
housing programs are in principle targeted to low-wage workers, leakage is high. For
example, according to 1996 INGEI data, information is available on beneficiaries
from INFONAVIT in the six-month period preceding the survey. The mean quar-
terly household income of beneficiary households was MXP$16,200, versus
MXP$10,500 nationally. While the sample size for beneficiaries on which this com-
parison is made is very small, this confirms that housing programs are not well tar-
geted to low-wage workers.
Social Security
In urban areas, social security reform helped reduce the amount of taxes paid by the
poorer segment of the formal sector. While the government has implemented a
number of new programs to help the rural poor (these are discussed below and in
subsequent sections), there is a feeling that less is done for the urban poor than for
the rural poor—at least, there is a perception that the strategy for poverty reduction
is less advanced in urban compared to rural areas. Still, one of the positive conse-
quences of social security reform, and more specifically of the Seguro de Enfermedad
y Maternidad, has been the reduction in the contributions paid by low-income
workers. For workers earning up to three minimum wages, the reduction in contri-
butions represents an increase in net earnings of 2.6 percent. A question that
remains is how to make such benefits available to informal workers.
Not All Agricultural Programs Benefit the Rural Poor in the Same Way
The government of Mexico has been liberalizing the rural economy. Until the late
1980s, the government played a dominant role in production and marketing deci-
sions in agriculture, especially in the ejido sector. The government granted land and
water resources to ejidos. The community’s members, or ejidatarios, had usufruct
rights over the land they cultivated, but were not allowed to enter sale, rental, or
sharecropping contracts. They were prohibited from hiring wage labor, and absences
from the ejido could lead to the loss of land rights. By the early 1990s, the ejido sec-
tor accounted for half of Mexico’s farmland and three quarters of the nation’s pro-
ducers. It provided a critical instrument for the government to implement its pro-
duction and marketing policies for the agricultural sector. With the reforms that
began in the late 1980s, the relationship between the ejidos and the state underwent
a dramatic change. Restrictions on the sale and rental of ejido land and on the hir-
ing of labor were lifted. The state no longer told the ejidatarios what to grow and
how to market their output. At the same time, the government no longer provided
widespread technical assistance, input and output subsidies, or marketing channels.
It could be that the poor have been hurt in the short term by the termination of gov-
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ernment support programs for farmers following the liberalization of Mexican agri-
culture agreed to as part of NAFTA. Yet this is far from certain, since programs such
as input and credit subsidies tended to favor large farmers, and since lower agricul-
tural prices may have helped the poorest, who are also net consumers of maize and
other crops. Moreover, rather than talking of a reduction in government support to
rural areas, it is more precise to talk of a change in the type of support provided, with
the implementation of new programs such as PROCAMPO and Alianza.
PROCAMPO
PROCAMPO, a cash transfer program facilitating the transition to a rural market
economy, reduces poverty among beneficiaries, and it may have a multiplier effect
on income. Since 1993–94, under the management of the SAGAR, PROCAMPO
has provided cash transfers to eligible agricultural producers of basic crops. The
transfers are provided on a per-hectare basis and will be phased out in 2008. In the
1997 fall–winter season, PROCAMPO’s transfers totaled MXP$7.5 billion and
were distributed to 3 million producers, covering 90 percent of Mexico’s cultivated
land. According to data from a SRA/World Bank panel survey of households living
in the ejido sector, the average payment per producer in 1997 was MXP$2,516 (for
an average of 5.2 hectares), and 84 percent of all ejidatarios participated. Despite a
decrease over time in the value of the transfers, the program reduces poverty and
inequality (details on PROCAMPO’s rules of operations are available in the Diario
Oficial de la Federación).
• Impact on Poverty. According to the 1997 SRA/World Bank survey,
PROCAMPO contributed an average of 8 percent toward the ejidatarios’
household income across all income deciles, and up to 40 percent in the poor-
est decile. It should be no surprise, therefore, that controlling for other house-
hold characteristics, participation in PROCAMPO reduced the probability of
being poor. More interesting is the fact that using the panel structure of the
survey, PROCAMPO appears to have a multiplier effect over time, in that a
transfer of 1 peso leads to benefits of 2 pesos. This multiplier may, but need
not be, Keynesian (higher income leads to higher consumption, which gener-
ates employment and more income). It may also be due to the possibility for
producers to take more risks with higher-yielding investments thanks to the
security provided by the transfer. Using other surveys, PROCAMPO has also
been shown to reduce income inequality, but not to a very large extent, due
to the high transfers received by large land owners.
• Areas for Improvement. To increase the impact of the program, the government
could: (a) pay the transfers earlier in the crop cycle, or at least announce the
amount of payment prior to planting, to facilitate the purchase of inputs and
to encourage investments among producers by providing a more secure
expected income; (b) allow ejidatarios to use part of their payment as a collat-
eral for loans; and (c) simplify the eligibility criteria, and promote better
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awareness of these criteria, especially among the indigenous population.
Progress has recently been made on recommendations (a) and (b). In addi-
tion, a larger impact on inequality and poverty could be achieved by reallo-
cating funds so that the amount received per hectare becomes a decreasing
function of the number of hectares cultivated. This may not be the main pri-
ority right now, but it could be considered in the future.
Alianza para el Campo
Alianza had not reduced poverty by 1997, but this may be because more time is
needed to realize benefits. Alianza was introduced in 1996 to provide matching
grants to agricultural producers to boost investments. It is the third-largest program
managed by SAGAR and accounts for 10 percent of the Ministry’s expenditures.
The main subprograms are ferti-irrigation; mechanization; rural equipment; pasture
improvement; and kilo-for-kilo, which provides growers with 1 kilo of certified
seeds for the price of 1 kilo of normal seeds. Alianza is decentralized, with cofi-
nancing required from state governments and beneficiary producers. While the cofi-
nancing requirements vary by subprogram, producers tend to contribute an average
of 50 percent, the federal government 32 percent, and the state governments 19 per-
cent. In 1997 1 million producers participated in Alianza. Of these, two thirds were
private producers, 11 percent (120,000) were ejidatarios, and 22 percent (241,000)
were comuneros.
• Impact on Poverty. Using the 1997 SRA/World Bank ejido survey, Alianza was
not found to have a significant impact on poverty among ejidatario house-
holds. This may be because poor ejidatarios lack resources to provide the
counterpart funding necessary for participation, and thus tend to participate
in the subprograms where counterpart funding requirements (but probably
also program outcomes) are lower—such as the kilo-for-kilo program. But it
may also be because the data collected in 1997 could not yet reflect the ben-
efits of investments made in 1996. It must also be noted that the ejido survey
is not representative of all the beneficiaries of the program. Finally, it could be
that some subprograms of Alianza are more poverty reducing than others (this
could be the case of Alianza subprograms for low-income producers which are
part of the targeted programs considered by the government in its overall
strategy for poverty reduction).
• Areas for Improvement. To increase the impact of the program, the government
could: (a) improve its dissemination in the ejido sector so that a larger pro-
portion of ejidatarios are aware of the program, understand its objectives, and
are clear on how to access the resources; (b) eliminate the requirements for
group participation (which may be difficult for the poorest) in some subpro-
grams; and (c) allow the ejidatarios to purchase their own inputs directly from
local distributors (rather than government-certified distributors), even if this
implies that the purchase price may (but need not) at first be higher.
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PROCEDE
PROCEDE may have a positive impact on social capital, thereby reducing poverty. It
is the land titling program which was created in 1992 to implement the revised Arti-
cle 27 of the Constitution and the Agrarian Laws approved earlier that year. Accord-
ing to official data, as of December 1997, 79 percent of the ejidos were participating
in PROCEDE and 59 percent had received ejidatario certificates and house titles. The
program was expected to have three main benefits. First, it would encourage invest-
ment in ejido land because farmers gained greater land security. Second, the reforms
would increase the supply of credit, because farmers could use their land as collateral
for loans. Third, the ability to engage in rental and sale transactions would promote a
more efficient allocation of land among producers. A fourth, unanticipated positive
outcome of PROCEDE is that it may have helped at the margin to increase social
cohesion and decrease land disputes in the ejido, thereby contributing to social capital,
which itself has been shown to help in reducing poverty. In the SRA/World Bank 1997
survey, ejidatarios were asked whether PROCEDE has had an impact on a number of
issues. Two thirds of the respondents replied that PROCEDE did not affect such
things as land tenure conflicts, social cohesion, access to credit, migration, land mar-
kets, and land investment decisions. However, when PROCEDE was cited as having
an impact (by one third of the respondents), those thinking it had a positive impact
outnumbered those thinking it had a negative impact. It is in this sense that PRO-
CEDE can be said to have had a positive impact on social capital. In turn, social cap-
ital was found to have facilitated the adoption of PROCEDE in the ejidos.
Agricultural Programs and the Indigenous Populations
The indigenous differ from the nonindigenous in their attitude toward government
programs. Indigenous populations in Mexico make up 10 percent of the population
(10 million people), and a much larger share of the poor. In rural areas, they are con-
centrated in ejidos and other traditional communities. Government policy toward
the indigenous populations has historically promoted integration rather than an
alternative model of development, and indigenous communities have not always
responded positively to the government’s interventions. A comparison of the atti-
tudes of the indigenous population toward PROCEDE, PROCAMPO, and Alianza
confirms the existence of an indigenous specificity. Being indigenous or not was
found to have more influence on the attitude toward government programs than
other household characteristics, such as being poor or not. For example, controlling
for these other household characteristics, the indigenous were found to be less likely
to be in favor of PROCEDE and Dominio Pleno (which refers to the full privatiza-
tion of the land) than the nonindigenous, not because they fear losing their land,
but because of the potentially negative impact of the program on the community.
Yet, at the same time, where PROCEDE has been implemented, the indigenous
have judged its impact on the community more favorably than the nonindigenous,
underscoring the fact that when an indigenous community takes the decision to go
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for land titling, it tends to be based on wide agreement within the community. The
analysis of indigenous attitudes also suggests that the lack of knowledge about
PROCAMPO and Alianza was more a reason for not participating in the programs
among the indigenous population than among the nonindigenous. This suggests
that the government should make a deliberate attempt at better informing the
indigenous population about its programs and their requirements, a finding meas-
ured in the ejido survey but likely to be valid in other policy areas as well.
Because the indigenous populations are among the poorest, additional work on
how to help them emerge from poverty should be conducted. For example, in the
report on which this Chapter is based, the evaluation of government programs in
agriculture did not have the information available to analyze structural issues related
to different needs or interests among indigenous populations with communal or
ejido tenure, where traditional governance and values persist. In addition, while this
Chapter does compare the impact of education programs such as PARE on school
performance among indigenous and nonindigenous populations (in Section IV), it
does not discuss the evidence available in both the developed and developing world
that bilingual education can be viewed as much more than teaching in two lan-
guages. Bilingual education can be, in the case of marginalized peoples, a curricu-
lum aimed at building skills, self-esteem, self-empowerment, parental involvement,
and adaptive learning. In healthcare, work could be done on the use and effective-
ness of indigenous medicinal treatments, and on whether programs such as
PROGRESA and PAC should take into account indigenous medicinal practices.
The data available for this Chapter also provided little information about a number
of other indigenous initiatives, such as informal credit systems, that may create a
synergy with particular types of government interventions (such as the Fondos
Regionales Indigenas), and thereby improve the impact of government programs. The
fact that some government programs are not building on such synergies is one of the
main criticisms of government planning put forth by the indigenous leadership.
IV. Investments in the Human Capital of the Poor
Mexico has put in place targeted programs for investing in the human capital of the
poor. There is ample evidence that programs benefiting the education, health, and
nutrition of children have long-term positive impacts on their well-being. Hence
governments around the world have implemented programs dealing with these
issues. Mexico’s originality is that it is trying to build on the linkages between edu-
cation, health, and nutrition. This is taking place mainly through PROGRESA,
Mexico’s new flagship program for the reduction of poverty. Apart from
PROGRESA, Mexico currently has three other groups of programs dealing, respec-
tively, with food (subsidies and school breakfasts), compensatory education, and
healthcare for the uninsured. The funding levels for 1998 and 1999 (in 2000 pesos)
for these four categories of programs are provided in Figure 7.
GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS AND POVERTY 585
PP 569-616.rrd  4/4/01  2:00 PM  Page 585
For 2000, the funding is presented in a different format, according to whether
the programs are demand or supply side. The demand-side programs include the
education component of PROGRESA, Niños de Solidaridad (The Estimulos a la
Educación Básica component of FAIS), the school breakfast programs of DIF, the
nutrition component of PROGRESA, the means-tested subsidized milk program
(Liconsa), and the means-tested tortilla program (Abasto de Tortilla de Fidelist). The
programs on the supply side include, for health, PAC, IMSS-Solidaridad, the health
component of PROGRESA, the social assistance of INI, and the social security pro-
gram for agricultural laborers. For education, the supply-side programs include the
CONAFE programs, the Albergues Indígenas of INI, and the telesecondary program.
For nutrition, the supply-side program includes the DICONSA stores. This section
analyzes PROGRESA, including a review of preliminary evaluation results; evaluates
both food subsidies and school breakfasts, and compares them; and describes com-
pensatory education and evaluates the impact of PARE.
PROGRESA
PROGRESA’s share of funds has increased, while funding for food assistance has
decreased. Real expenditures for human capital programs are rising, in large part due
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Figure 7. Spending for Human Capital, 1998–2000
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to the implementation of PROGRESA in 1997. By the end of that year, the pro-
gram was under way in 12,000 localities and 500 municipalities in 13 states, pro-
viding benefits to 400,000 families. Today, the program covers 2.6 million families,
which represents 4 out of every 5 families in extreme poverty in rural areas, and 14
percent of Mexico’s population. PROGRESA’s share of funds devoted to human
capital is increasing.
The share of funds devoted to the other programs is decreasing, with the largest
drop affecting nutrition (especially food subsidies; these subsidies could however be
considered as income transfers to the extent that evidence is lacking regarding their
impact on nutrition). This is a deliberate and appropriate choice made to favor pro-
grams which are better targeted and which involve co-responsibility on the part of
beneficiaries. One issue is that programs such as PROGRESA do not reach the
smallest and remotest communities, so that part of the rural population does not
benefit from the reform of the programs implemented in the last sexenio.
PROGRESA Has Sound Features, but There May Be Areas for Improvement
PROGRESA aims to improve education, health, and nutrition among the rural
poor, and to build on positive linkages between them. Preliminary evaluation results
are encouraging. Education has a positive impact on health. In Mexico, infant mor-
tality rates are twice as high among households with illiterate mothers as among
households with mothers having at least 7 years of basic education. In turn, good
health and nutrition have positive effects on education, if only because they improve
a child’s learning ability. PROGRESA provides integrated support at the household
level for education, health, and nutrition, with the hope that the impact of the pro-
gram as a whole will be larger than that of its parts. The preliminary results of an
evaluation conducted by PROGRESA staff with the support of IFPRI are encour-
aging. The morbidity among children between ages 0 and 2 has diminished by 22
percent. The female enrollment rate in secondary-level schools has increased by 21
percent. The attendance at health clinics has increased by 18 percent. Overall,
school attendance has increased by 1 year, which could translated in the future into
an increase of lifetime earnings of up to 12 percent. These results alone would make
the program cost-effective.
PROGRESA’s targeting mechanism is basically sound, but some questions
remain. PROGRESA uses a three-stage targeting mechanism. First, using census
data, poor rural localities are selected on the basis of their level of marginalization.
Because local access to education and health services is required for participation,
some highly isolated localities are excluded. The second stage consists of selecting
eligible families within participating communities. For this, PROGRESA collects
data on all households living in participating communities. A multivariate discrim-
inant analysis is used to classify households as poor or nonpoor. The analysis takes
into account not only income, but also other indicators. Families classified as non-
poor cannot participate in the program. The third stage consists of checking the
selection of the program beneficiaries within the community: local communities
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have the opportunity to review the targeting proposed by PROGRESA, and to sug-
gest a second visit by PROGRESA staff if they believe that some poor families
should be reclassified as nonpoor or vice versa. While the targeting mechanism used
by PROGRESA is basically sound, a few issues remain:
• Community Involvement. There is some evidence that PROGRESA’s targeting
system is not always successful in identifying the needy. It is of course impos-
sible to achieve perfect targeting and, overall, PROGRESA does a good job at
selecting beneficiaries. The third step in the targeting procedure could help in
going beyond the statistical correlation between observable signs of income
status (house materials for example) and well-being in order to select benefi-
ciaries. Yet, while community-based knowledge exists about who are the most
needy, the classification of poor or nonpoor households remains solely based
on the prediction made bt PROGRESA staff on the basis of the results of the
field survey. One of the reasons why the targeting process is centralized has to
do with the desire to avoid political interference in the choice of beneficiaries,
and to achieve fairness nationally. Nevertheless, more thought may be needed
to assess the role of communities in targeting, not as a primary selection
mechanism, but as a useful complement.
• Need for Targeting in Very Poor Communities. Another question relates to the very
need for targeting in some of the poorest rural communities. The higher the
proportion of the poor in a community, the less the need to target within that
community, especially if targeting is costly not so much in terms of administra-
tion (the administrative cost is low, at MXP$170 per household at most), but
rather in terms of social cohesion. PROGRESA has increased the percentage of
households receiving benefits in participating communities, with three out of
four households now receiving support. In some communities, the percentage
is higher. In these communities, rather than leaving a few families without access
to the program, it may be better to grant it to all in order to avoid conflicts. This
choice has been recommended by IFPRI in Honduras, where it is advising on
the redesign of PRAF, a program similar to PROGRESA. However, one prob-
lem with the idea of not targeting the program in small and highly marginalized
localities is that two households living in different localities but otherwise simi-
lar would be treated differently, which raises issues of fairness.
PROGRESA’s use of cash grants is appropriate, but the level of the grants is rel-
atively high. PROGRESA provides cash grants in return for parents sending their
children to school and using health facilities. The use of cash grants is in principle
appropriate because it avoids utility losses associated with in-kind support. The pro-
gram also provides valuable incentives through its requirements. Yet more work is
needed to assess whether the program’s cost-effectiveness is optimal. In 1999, the
educational grants ranged from MXP$70 per child in third grade of primary school
to MXP$255 per child in the third year of secondary school (the grants are the same
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for boys and girls in primary school, but they are slightly higher for girls than for
boys in secondary school). Families can have several children benefiting from the
cash grants up to a maximum cumulative amount of MXP$525 per month (see Fig-
ure 8). The children also receive a lump-sum payment per year for schooling mate-
rial (MXP$45 in primary school and MXP$170 in secondary school). Finally, the
families receive both monthly cash grants of MXP$105 to help them meet their
nutritional requirements, and food supplements free of charge. While on average
families receive about MXP$250 (22 percent of their income), they can receive up
to MXP$600 per month depending on the number and age of the children.
While the grants may represent a premium over the wages children would earn
if they were working, international experience suggests that grants below the pre-
vailing child labor wage may be sufficient to keep children in school because parents
value schooling in itself (for altruistic reasons or future intergenerational transfers).
To justify the high level of the PROGRESA grants, it could be argued that the grants
should provide not only schooling incentives, but also improve the families’ overall
level of income and quality of life. The question, however, is whether there may be
more cost-effective ways to reach this objective. Another argument for the relatively
high level of the PROGRESA grants has to do with opportunity costs for partici-
pating in the program not directly related to child labor. In some isolated commu-
nities it takes time for parents to go to the office where the PROGRESA allowances
are paid. These and other transaction costs may make it necessary to provide higher
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Figure 8. Monthly Cash Transfers from PROGRESA
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payments to induce participation, but again, more work may be needed to establish
optimal benefit levels.
PROGRESA is succeeding in raising school enrollment and the demand for
healthcare, but this generates tensions on the supply side. According to data from
PROGRESA, school enrollment has increased substantially. Critics argue, however,
that while PROGRESA is increasing enrollment, the quality of education is suffer-
ing as a result of this increase. Some schools may have found themselves ill-prepared
to handle the larger student body. The larger issue in terms of the quality of the edu-
cation provided relates to the impact of PROGRESA on educational achievement,
and ultimately on future earnings. To assess such long-term benefits in a robust way,
it may be necessary to follow cohorts of PROGRESA students well into the next
decades. As for schooling, the demand for healthcare has increased, but a number of
problems remain. At least at the beginning some clinics have had a hard time han-
dling the extra work generated by the program. There is anecdotal evidence that
some beneficiaries have had to wait for long periods, and the examinations per-
formed by physicians have not always been thorough due to time constraints placed
on them. Some beneficiaries who had to travel for several hours to reach a clinic
were told they would not be able to see a doctor and had to return at a later date.
Some health centers have been running out of medicine.
PROGRESA may also be encountering resistance to family planning in some
indigenous communities. Here, the larger issue is how receptive beneficiaries are to
PROGRESA’s intended message of preventive self-care, and how attentive health
staff are to the social context in which they operate. Steps have been taken to coor-
dinate PROGRESA’s action with that of SEP and SSA, but more may be needed to
optimize demand- and supply-side interventions and assess the relative impact of
both. In Honduras, for example, where IFPRI is building on its experience with
PROGRESA in order to advise PRAF staff on how to improve their program, it was
decided to evaluate the relative impact of demand-side and supply-side interventions
by testing four combinations of programs: demand-side only, supply-side only, no
intervention, and both interventions.
Food Programs
Mexico maintains food subsidies for milk and tortilla, and a network of public
stores. The three government programs providing food subsidies are LICONSA
(milk), Fidelist, and DICONSA (stores in poor rural areas). Their total cost in 1998
was MXP$6.1 billion.
• Milk. For the past 15 years, LICONSA (Leche Industrializada Conasupo) has
been producing milk for Mexico’s poor. Qualifying families can purchase from
8 to 24 liters of milk per week at a discount of roughly 25 percent off the mar-
ket price. To qualify, families must earn less than two minimum wages and
have children under age 12. The ration of milk is determined by the number
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of children under age 12 (8 liters for families with one or two children, 12
liters for families with three children, and 24 liters for families with 4 children
or more). About 5.1 million children benefit from the subsidies.
• Fidelist. The tortilla program administered by Fidelist is accessible to families
earning less than two minimum wages. These families are eligible to receive 1
kilogram of subsidized tortilla per day. Participants use a bar-coded card which
is scanned at participating tortillerias. The owner of the tortilleria is later reim-
bursed for the cost of the subsidized tortillas he or she has distributed.
• Public Stores. DICONSA (Distribuidora Comercial Conasupo) is a public net-
work of small stores providing basic products such as rice and toilet paper to
marginalized rural communities. Goods are sold at low prices, yielding an
average savings of 16.5 percent for beneficiary households. A central feature
of the program is community participation through local Rural Committees
of Supply. The program operates in 2,300 municipalities, with 23,468 points
of sales. In 1997 it sold 1.6 million tons of products, bringing its sales total
for that year to MXP$5.7 billion.
Means-tested food subsidies are more effective than other subsidies in reducing
inequality and improving welfare. An analysis of the impact on inequality and social
welfare of subsidies shows that the long-anticipated phasing out of the general sub-
sidy on tortilla in the first few months of 1999 was warranted because means-tested
food subsidies are more inequality-reducing and less price distorting.
• Food Subsidies are Better than Nonfood Subsidies. For many years the govern-
ment provided general subsidies on tortilla. Part of the rationale was that since
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Table 1. Coverage of Food Subsidies, 1998
LICONSA
Points of sale for LICONSA milk (number of dairies) 11,052 
Beneficiary municipalities 1,912 
Beneficiaries (in thousands) 5,100 
DICONSA
Points of sale for DICONSA (stores) 23,468 
Target beneficiary population (thousands) 33,798 
Value of distributed volume (millions of pesos) 6,630 
Subsidized tortilla
Kilograms of tortilla distributed per day (thousands) 1,512 
Localities attended 1,024 
Affiliated tortillerias 13,973 
Source: Government of Mexico.
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tortilla represented a larger share of the consumption of the poor, the subsidy
was to some extent self-targeted. It is true that the tortilla subsidy reduced
inequality, especially in urban areas, and much more so than subsidies for util-
ities such as water and electricity. However, the tortilla subsidy generated price
distortions and was costly. Furthermore, it was significantly less effective in
reducing inequality than a similar generalized subsidy would have been on
corn flour, for example.
• Within Food Subsidies, Means-Tested Subsidies are Better than Generalized Sub-
sidies. Using the 1996 INEGI and the 1997 ENCASEH surveys, it has been
shown that the marginal reduction in inequality in consumption achieved
with the generalized tortilla subsidy does not come close to the reduction
achieved with the means-tested subsidies provided by LICONSA and the
means-tested tortilla program.
• Within Means-Tested Food Subsidies, LICONSA and the means-tested Tortilla
Program Have Similar Impacts. In rural areas, LICONSA has a larger marginal
impact on inequality, but the means-tested tortilla program is more inequal-
ity reducing in urban areas and nationally. Overall, the two programs have
similar impacts, but the cost of implementing the means-tested tortilla pro-
gram is lower than that of implementing LICONSA.
The government also provides school breakfasts, food support, and community
kitchens through three food programs administered by DIF (Desarollo Integral de la
Familia):
• School Breakfasts. By end of 1998, DIF’s school breakfasts were distributed
in more than 2,400 municipalities. From 1995 to 1998, the number of
breakfasts distributed daily more than doubled from 1.9 million to 4.4
million. While higher priority is now being given to hot breakfasts (Fig-
ure 9), whether this represents a good use of resources needs to be assessed
because hot breakfasts imply higher costs, which need not translate into
higher learning gains or nutritional impacts. The federal government pays
63 percent of the program’s cost, and the rest is covered by states and
municipalities. Through local committees, 400,000 mothers participate
each day in the preparation of the breakfasts, which is a plus in terms of
community involvement, but which also represents an opportunity cost in
terms of time for the families involved. While the program had an urban
bias in the past, today the rural southern states receive a higher share of
the breakfasts.
• Food Support. DIF’s PASAF (Programa de Asistencia Social Alimentaria a
Familias) provides monthly in-kind food support for families with children
under age 5 or pregnant women. By the end of 1998 the program served 1.4
million families in 1,633 municipalities. Of these, 10 percent were indigenous
families and 30 percent lived in areas of high marginalization.
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• Community Kitchen. DIF supports community kitchens by providing equip-
ment and part of the cost of food with the idea that, in addition to benefiting
nutrition, these interventions will contribute to the social fabric of the com-
munities and serve as anchors for other education and health interventions.
By end 1998, 6,067 kitchens were operating in 1,159 municipalities serving
520,000 beneficiaries.
To some extent, DIF’s school breakfasts and Niños de Solidaridad improve school
enrollment and reduce child labor in rural areas. The aim of the government’s food
programs is to improve nutrition for the poor, and thereby to build their human
capital. While the impact of food programs on nutritional outcomes and learning
performance cannot be measured with the data at hand, other criteria such as the
impact on school enrollment and child labor can be used to assess how the programs
build human capital.
• Impact of DIF’s School Breakfasts. While food subsidies are unlikely to have
strong impacts on school enrollment and child labor, DIF’s school breakfasts
may have an impact because they are provided in schools. If the benefit of a
school breakfast is assimilated to a reduction in the price (opportunity cost)
of going to school, economic theory predicts that school breakfasts will
increase school enrollment, while the impact on child labor is uncertain due
to substitution with leisure. In empirical work based on the 1997 ENCASEH
GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS AND POVERTY 593
Figure 9. Coverage and Type of School Breakfast
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survey, DIF’s school breakfasts were found to have a larger impact on school-
ing than on child labor, as expected.
• Impact of Niños de Solidaridad. This program, whose name was recently
changed to Estimulos a la Educación Básica, is run by SEDESOL. It gives grants
to children who complete the first three years of their elementary education in
the hope of providing them with an incentive to complete their primary edu-
cation. Between 1995 and 1997, 857,000 children were awarded scholarships.
An analysis similar to that performed for DIF’s school breakfast also indicates
some impact on schooling and child labor, but not in a systematic way.
DIF’s programs and Niños de Solidaridad tend to be better targeted than food
subsidies. Table 2 provides measures of the targeting effectiveness of food programs
using the 1997 ENCASEH. Although there may be underreporting in the survey as
to who benefits from the programs, and although the results may be sensitive to the
choice of the poverty line, DIF and Niños de Solidaridad are clearly better targeted
to the poor than means-tested food subsidies, in large part because the means-tested
tortilla program and LICONSA are mainly available in urban areas where the inci-
dence of poverty is lower. The same applies to DICONSA (not shown in the table),
whose stores are not available in some of the poorest rural communities. Overall, the
placement of food programs is apparently driven not only by income considerations,
but also by (ease of ) supply considerations.
• DIF, Niños de Solidaridad, and PROGRESA Provide Incentives, While Food
Subsidies Do Not, or at Least Do Not to the Same Extent. Parents must send
their children to school if they want to benefit from school-based programs,
while they have no such obligation in order to benefit from food subsidies. Of
course, there is no guarantee that by increasing school attendance, school-
based programs actually increase the human capital of the poor. Beyond the
immediate benefit of the programs, parents must buy into the importance of
schooling and help their children at home. The schools must also be of suffi-
cient quality for the children to be able to learn. But at least programs with
built-in positive incentives, such as DIF, Niños, and PROGRESA, hold the
promise of bringing long-term changes for the poor. This is less the case with
food subsidies. Thus, the strategy of the government to progressively decrease
food subsidies is sound.
• Better Programs Could Be Implemented in Urban Areas if Food Subsidies Were
Reduced. A risk in scaling back food subsidies further is that urban areas may
suffer. As noted in the introduction, the current split of the targeted expendi-
tures for the reduction of poverty between urban and rural areas is adequate.
Yet cutting food subsidies, which are mostly urban based, could tilt the bal-
ance too much in favor of rural areas. Thus the ideal would be to reorient food
subsidies toward urban programs which yield benefits similar to what
PROGRESA is achieving in rural areas.
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• Further Cost-Benefit Analyses Should Be Conducted for Food Programs. To bet-
ter assess the performance of various programs, detailed cost-benefit analyses
should be prepared by combining survey-based impact evaluations of food
programs with administrative records on costs and outreach. More informa-
tion is also needed about the relative costs and efficiency of cash transfers,
food subsidies, food stamps, and direct food handouts, and on the ability of
food markets to function well.
Compensatory Education 
While PROGRESA is demand driven, compensatory education seeks to improve
the quality and supply of schooling. The geographic dispersion of marginalized rural
areas presents obstacles for educators and families. Teachers usually teach in a single
classroom with children of all ages. Children must travel vast distances to reach their
schools, creating logistical problems for their families. The quality of educational
materials and instruction provided to children is commonly substandard. In many
cases, education beyond sixth grade simply does not exist. Not surprisingly, the aca-
demic achievement of these children falls below national averages. The following
programs have been implemented to deal with this (Figure 10):
• PARE. Initiated during the 1991–92 school year, PARE’s (Programa para
Abatir el Rezago Educativo) objective is to improve regular, rural, and indige-
nous primary education in the states of Chiapas, Guerrero, Hidalgo, and Oax-
aca. A four-year program, PARE provides schools with improved materials
596 MEXICO—A COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA FOR THE NEW ERA
Figure 10. Compensatory Education Programs
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such as textbooks. It also provides financial incentives for teachers, for exam-
ple to assist in a regular way to classes and to provide support to the children
outside of the classroom. PARE has improved education facilities through the
construction and repair of schools and the creation of libraries. The program
had 1.2 million beneficiaries in 1997.
• PAREB. Based on the experiences of PARE, PAREB (Programa para Abatir el
Rezago en Educación Básica) began in 1994 and continued through the
1998–99 school year in 10 states: Campeche, Durango, Guanajato, Jalisco,
Michoacán, Puebla, San Luis Potosí, Tabasco, Veracruz, Yucatán.
• PIARE. The Programa Integral para Abatir el Rezago Educativo was initiated in
1995 and will be continued through 2000. The program supports preschool,
elementary school, and adult education programs in selected communities. It
had 1.2 million beneficiaries in 23 states in 1997.
• PRODEI. Undertaken in 1981, PRODEI (Programa para el Desarrollo de la
Educación Inicial) works with parents of children under age 4 to improve child
rearing and cognitive development to facilitate the transition to primary edu-
cation. In 1997 the program had 313,000 beneficiaries in 10 states.
• PAED. The Programa de Apoyo a Escuelas en Desventaja, was created in 1992
to address the needs of schools not supported by PARE, PAREB, and PIARE.
The program provides supplies and furniture to schools in Aguascalientes,
Baja California, Baja California Sur, Morelos, Nuevo León, Tamaulipas, and
Tlaxcala. It had 178,500 beneficiaries in 1997. Beginning with the 1998–99
school year, the program will be replaced by PIARE in these regions.
The positive impact of PARE is weaker for the poorest of the poor and for indige-
nous children. Previous analyses have shown that on the whole PARE has had a pos-
itive impact on student test scores. But what is the impact of the program on the
poorest of the poor? Additional analysis of the PARE panel data was undertaken to
answer this question. Four results were obtained. First, controlling for other child,
household, and school characteristics, participation at the school level in PARE did
not significantly improve the test score in Spanish (in sixth grade) of the poorest
children of the indigenous group, while the program had positive impacts on less-
poor indigenous children. Second, in the sample of nonindigenous rural schools,
PARE improved the learning achievement of both very poor and less-poor children,
although the former benefited slightly less than the later. Third, taking both indige-
nous and regular rural schools together, it would appear that the poorest children
increased their Spanish test scores by only half of the gain achieved by less-poor chil-
dren. Fourth, in the urban sample the PARE interventions appeared to have signif-
icantly negative effects on Spanish test scores for both the very poor and the poor.
The negative impact (in absolute value) was larger among the poorest students. It is
difficult to explain this negative impact in urban areas, but it should be noted that
the PARE program did not pay much attention to urban schools, except toward the
end of the life of the program. In addition, the fact that PARE did not improve
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much the Spanish skills of very poor and indigenous children may be due to factors
such as poor nutrition and health status among these groups. It would be interest-
ing to test whether programs such as PROGRESA achieve better results. Overall, the
conclusion of the analysis is that while supply-side interventions can boost the learn-
ing achievement of children, special attention and more resources may need to be
devoted to the poorest of poor children.
V. Income Opportunities for the Poor
Government-run programs focus on employment generation in rural areas and
training in urban areas. With the liberalization of the Mexican economy, the labor
market is undergoing transformation. In urban areas, the requirements for skills are
rising and the labor force needs training. In rural areas, temporary employment pro-
grams are needed to maintain income opportunities during seasonal slowdowns.
Credit and training are also needed to help the rural population make the transition
to the nonfarm sector. Finally, while employment opportunities must be created for
adults, there is a need to reduce child labor and increase schooling. This section is
devoted to selected employment issues. It appraises the targeting and cost-
effectiveness of PET; briefly describes the other employment and credit programs
targeted to the poor; and discusses PROBECAT, the training program for the unem-
ployed mainly in urban areas.
Programa de Empleo Temporal
This program provides off-season temporary employment below minimum wage in
marginalized rural areas. PET provides short-term employment on public projects
in marginalized rural areas. Employment is for up to 88 working days at 90 percent
of the minimum wage. In 2000, PET’s budget will be MXP$4.8 billion, more than
half of the budget devoted to income opportunities for the poor. In total, close to
100 million workdays and 1 million jobs will be created.
Apart from benefiting participants through the provision of an income during
periods of high unemployment or underemployment, PET benefits communities by
building infrastructure and responding to local needs. Projects are labor intensive.
Examples include irrigating land, paving roads, clearing land, improving housing,
and installing water and sewerage systems. PET has national coverage, but a large
share of funds is spent in the Southern states, which are poorer. Separate PET pro-
grams are administered in these areas by the Ministry of Social Development
(SEDESOL, 47 percent of total funds), the Ministry of Transport and Communi-
cations (SCT, 33 percent), the Ministry of Agriculture (SAGAR, 17 percent), and
the Ministry of the Environment (SEMARNAP, 3 percent) (Figure 11).
Program participants need PET more than nonparticipants, and they are poorer.
Data on PET participants are available in the 1997 ENCASEH survey for margin-
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alized rural areas (which are those targeted by the program). A few summary indi-
cators for participants and nonparticipants are given in Table 3. According to the
monthly income of the household head, participants are poorer than nonpartici-
pants (with nonparticipants themselves poorer than the national average, since the
survey was conducted in poor areas). But if one uses literacy or assets as proxies for
well-being, participants are better off than nonparticipants. Participants are less
likely to be indigenous and agricultural laborers. A striking difference between par-
ticipants and nonparticipants is, as expected, that participants need temporary jobs
more than nonparticipants because they do not benefit as often from an occupation
that keeps them employed all year long. This is either because they are involved in
seasonal work or because they work on a solicitation basis. PET thus helps alleviate
underemployment, which is its goal.
PET may not reach the smallest and most isolated rural communities. The
community-level data of the 1997 ENCASEH for marginalized rural areas also
enable us to compare the characteristics of the communities benefiting from PET
with those which do not benefit (10.8 percent of 6,886 sampled communities ben-
efit). On average, PET communities are almost twice as large (575 inhabitants ver-
sus 344) as non-PET communities. PET communities have better access to elec-
tricity (74 percent versus 60 percent), public phones (33 percent versus 19 percent),
preschools (81 percent versus 67 percent), primary schools (89 percent versus 82
percent), and telesecondary schools (22 percent versus 11 percent). Thus, the pro-
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Figure 11. Government Spending for Income Employment, 2000 Pesos
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gram may not reach the smallest, most isolated, and in all likelihood poorest, com-
munities. While part of this targeting problem may be due to the higher costs of
reaching smaller communities, part may also be due to the lack of bargaining power
of small communities in obtaining funds from program administrators at the state
level.
The cost of generating 1 peso in additional income for the poor through PET is
about 3.5 pesos, but this does not take into account the benefits from the work done
by PET workers. As indicated in Box 1, rough appraisal methods are available to
assess the cost-effectiveness of employment programs such as PET. While these
methods do not replace detailed econometric analysis (for which better data on PET
would have to be collected), they provide an order of magnitude of the benefits of
the program. The measure of cost-effectiveness used is the share of total program
costs which reaches the poor through PET’s wages. This share is a function of four
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Table 3. Characteristics of PET Participants
Participants
Yes No
Household Characteristics
Household size 5.4 5.2
Age of household head 46.8 44.6
Indigenous language for head 40.1% 48.4%
Literacy for head 76.0% 61.7%
Principal Occupation of Head
Agricultural laborer 33.5% 44.5%
Work in Principal Occupation
From time to time 14.0% 8.4%
A few months per year 29.8% 19.1%
All year long 56.3% 72.5%
Reason Why Not All Year Long
Seasonal-type work 68.6% 81.3%
Work only when solicited 21.2% 13.9%
Assets
House owner 97.3% 93.3%
Land owner 83.5% 65.0%
Monthly Income of Head
Household income 578 628
Per capita income 128 153
Source: World Bank staff estimates.
PP 569-616.rrd  4/4/01  2:00 PM  Page 600
parameters: the proportionate wage gain, the targeting performance, the wage share,
and the budget leverage.
• Proportionate Wage Gain. If having a PET job does not increase the probabil-
ity of finding another job, which is realistic in poor rural areas, then the pro-
portionate wage gain in the absence of unemployment benefits is one minus
the probability of working outside of PET. According to Table 3, half the PET
participants have occupations that enable them to work all year long. If they
can indeed work on their own or find another job, the proportionate wage
gain could be about 0.5, corresponding to those participants who cannot
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Box 1. A Simple Framework for Measuring the Cost-Effectiveness of Public
Works
Assume that without public works, an individual has a probability F* to find
employment at market wage W*. Expected earnings are F*W*. With public works,
the individual earns the public works wage W. If the individual can continue to
search for private or self-employment while participating in public works, with
probability F of finding such employment, the expected wage with public works is
FW*+(1-F)W. The net wage benefit from the program for the worker is NWB =
(1-F)W - (F* - F)W*. If the worker gets unemployment benefits or a subsistence
allowance S, the wage benefit is reduced to NWB = (1-F)W - (F* - F)W* - (1-F*)S.
If the program costs G to the government per worker employed, a measure of cost-
effectiveness is the share of public expenditures transferred to workers as wage gain
NWB/G. This measure can be decomposed as follows:
/        |         \            \
budget    wage    targeting   proportionate
leverage  share  performance  wage gain
The determinants of cost-effectiveness are (a) the leverage ratio C/G, where C is
the total cost per worker including community funding; (b) the wage share
(W+L)/C, where W stands for wages paid to the poor and L stands for wages
paid for the nonpoor resulting in leakage; (c) the targeting performance
W/(W+L), which is the percentage of wages reaching the poor; and (d) the pro-
portionate wage gain NWB/W. This model can be extended to take into account
the benefits of the infrastructure built by public works.
NWB
G
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+
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work all year long (0.5 was also the proportionate wage gain observed for
Argentina’s public employment programTrabajar before changes were imple-
mented in the program).
• Targeting Performance. In poor rural areas, PET households are poorer than
nonparticipating households in terms of income, but they tend to have better
human and physical capital. Overall, one could say that participants are sim-
ilar to nonparticipants within marginalized areas. In this case, the poverty rate
within marginalized rural areas, which may reach up to 80 percent, is an
appropriate measure of targeting performance, given that the program is pre-
cisely targeted to these areas.
• Wage Share. Multiplying the number of workdays to be created in 1999 by
PET by the wage rate (90 percent of the minimum wage of geographic zone
C, which corresponds to MXP$26.70 per day in January 1999), one gets a
total wage bill of MXP$2.5 billion. The total budget allocated to PET for 1999
was MXP3.6 billion, which results in a wage share of close to 70 percent.
• Budget Leverage. The program is almost entirely financed by the federal gov-
ernment (even though project selection is often at the state or local level).
Hence the budget leverage is equal to 1.
COST-EFFECTIVENESS. Given the above (very rough) hypotheses, the overall cost-
effectiveness of the program is 0.28. Thus, it would take slightly more than 3.5 pesos
of federal funds to generate 1 peso in additional income for the poor through PET.
This figure is higher than that of employment programs in India, but lower than
what is observed in Argentina, at least before changes were made in Trabajar. Note,
however, that in the above estimate, the benefits of the public works themselves have
not been taken into account, and they can be big. If good survey data were collected
on Trabajar participants, more precise estimates of the cost-effectiveness of the pro-
gram could be obtained.
Mexico could learn from experiences abroad to increase community participation
and funding. Several useful lessons for PET can be learned from the reform of Traba-
jar. In Argentina, the difficulties of 1996–97, during which unemployment reached 40
percent in the poorest population decile of Greater Buenos Aires, provided an impetus
to improve Trabajar (adding 300,000 participants from May 1997 to October 1998).
While keeping the self-targeting feature of the program (as in Mexico, minimum wages
ensure participation by the poor), the focus of the reform was placed on increasing com-
munity participation and funding in the choice of the projects to be financed.
Trabajar now works in collaboration with local community groups, NGOs, and
municipalities which present projects for selection (some community participation
is also observed in Mexico). While Trabajar covers the cost of labor, local sponsor-
ing groups cover nonwage costs. Projects must first be approved for technical feasi-
bility. Next, they are selected on a points basis. More points are awarded to projects
that are located in poorer areas, that yield larger public benefits, that benefit from
well-regarded sponsoring community groups or NGOs, and that reduce labor costs
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below the minimum wage. These new features have improved targeting both at the
geographic and individual level. Apart from increasing cost-effectiveness at the fed-
eral level, the involvement of local groups has also improved the quality of moni-
toring and feedback. All problems have not been solved, however. There remains
evidence of political influence in the choice of participants, and of gender discrimi-
nation (few women are selected in some areas). Local groups are not always well
positioned to contribute to nonwage costs, and the provision of jobs takes prece-
dence over the projects’ quality in some areas.
Other Employment Programs for the Poor 
Apart from PET, the government operates several smaller employment programs tar-
geting poor areas. The other half of federal funds devoted to employment and
income opportunities for the poor is allocated to smaller programs providing credit
or infrastructure. Some of these programs are as follows:
• Jornaleros Agrícolas. This program’s goal is to improve the living conditions of
migrant farm workers. It promotes collaboration between public and private
(producer) organizations to achieve these goals. In 1998 the program funded
13,650 projects in 14 states and 248 municipios, helping 682,000 workers. Of
all projects, 23 percent were for housing improvements; 22 percent for cul-
ture, recreation, and education; 18 percent for help with legal problems; and
the rest (27 percent) for nutrition, employment, training, and health. In 1999
the program expanded coverage into Jalisco.
• Fondos Regionales Indígenas (Apoyos Productivas del INI). These regional
indigenous funds encourage productive initiatives from local indigenous
groups in their place of origin. It is hoped these initiatives will become self-
financing in the long term. Earnings from the initiatives are reinvested in the
regional fund. Seventy-two percent of beneficiaries have been in Chiapas,
Guerrero, Oaxcaca,, San Luis Potosí, and Veracruz. In 1995, 146 regional
funds were established. This increased slightly in 1997 to 151. During
1995–97, 8,701 projects received some support and benefited 865,000
indigenous people.
• FONAES. The Fondo National de Apoyo a Empresas Sociales provides support
to small firms and other organizations that help develop the local economy,
and provide services in both rural and urbanizing areas (barrios populares).
Funds are used as risk capital, to act as a credit guarantee, and to encourage
productive investment and technological development, training is also pro-
vided. During 1995–97, 10,343 organizations received funding and 35,571
jobs were created. In 1998, 2,107 new groups received support. About 80 per-
cent of the projects tend to survive.
• Crédito a la Palabra. This program was established in 1990 to supply credit
for farmers excluded from commercial credit because of their perceived lack
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of productive potential and collateral. Farmers are supplied with no-interest
credit to finance the crop of their choice for up to 3 hectares. Credit is
obtained through a local committee, which petitions for funds. Loans are
repaid into a local social fund, which is administered by the municipal
government. During 1990–94, loans were for MXP$300 per hectare. In 1995
they were fixed at MXP$400, and today they are worth MXP$500 per
hectare. The loans may be insufficient to fund technological development or
innovation, and therefore they may simply support subsistence cultivation.
The area financed has decreased from 2 million hectares in 1990 to 1.2 mil-
lion hectares in 1998. A large part of the funds go to the southern states.
• CONAZA. The Comisión Nacional de las Zonas Aridas targets semi-arid and
arid areas with projects for productive growth and investments in local
infrastructure. Funds from Ramo 26 are available through this program,
which benefited 354 communities in 1998. Funding was allocated to 88
projects which covered 870 hectares. Projects covered a range of needs. For
example, 38 projects have provided and maintained drinking water or sew-
erage systems.
The impact of these programs on the farm and nonfarm economy should be
evaluated; however, due to lack of data it is not possible to do so. Such an evalua-
tion should focus on impacts not only at the household level, but also at the local
level within the context of the nonfarm economy becoming increasingly important
for survival and social mobility. According to data from the SAR/World Bank 1997
survey of the ejido sector, the probability of being poor is reduced by access to
employment in the nonfarm sector. Income mobility has increased for households
with members who found employment in commerce and other nonagricultural
sectors. This interacts with both individual variables such as education and gender,
and local variables such as access to labor markets through better roads. Human
capital is key for gaining earnings from the nonfarm sector. Yet it is not enough,
especially for women. Higher employment rates for men cannot be explained by
differences in human capital. Structural factors such as labor market demand,
household demographics, and employment practices are at play. This suggests that
policies focusing exclusively on human capital will have a limited impact on reduc-
ing gender inequity and poverty, which provides a role for employment programs
to fill part of the gap.
Training Programs
The two largest training programs are CIMO for the employed, and PROBECAT
for the unemployed. While training programs are not officially part of the govern-
ment’s strategy for the reduction of poverty, they are worth discussing here because
their goal is to increase human capital and facilitate the adaptation of the labor force
to the ongoing restructuring of the economy. There are two main programs:
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• CIMO. Since 1988, CIMO (Programa Calidad Integral y Modernización) has
provided technical assistance and financial support to training and productiv-
ity programs that take place within small and medium-sized businesses. The
program funds projects that increase the businesses’ productivity and enable
them to expand their workforce, develop their human capital, and improve
their working conditions. In 1997 there were 550,000 beneficiaries. While
the number of beneficiaries did not rise above the previous year’s level, it was
a significant increase over the 1995 level of 368,000.
• PROBECAT. The Programa de Becas de Capacitación para Desempleados was
implemented in 1986 as a response to the growth in unemployment that fol-
lowed the 1982 debt crisis and the subsequent structural adjustment policies.
By 1986 almost 20 percent of the workforce (5 million people) were unem-
ployed or seriously underemployed. PROBECAT was designed to combat this
mismatch between worker skills and firm requirements while simultaneously
helping workers weather economic shocks. Given that PROBECAT targets
the unemployed, it is more likely than CIMO to benefit the poor.
There are three main training modalities in PROBECAT. School-based, in-
service, and PILEOT. Table 4 provides an overview of the three main training modal-
ities in PROBECAT. The program began by providing school-based training. Later,
to better match workers’ skills with local employer needs, an in-service modality was
created whereby firms provide training to participants who receive their minimum-
wage stipend through PROBECAT. On completion of the training, 70 percent of the
trainees are guaranteed employment with the local trainer. Finally, in response to the
economic crisis of 1994–95, PILEOT (Programa de Iniciativas Locales de Empleo y
Ocupación Temporal) was initiated in 1995 to reach the economically disadvantaged
in marginalized areas. Thirty percent of PILEOT’s beneficiaries are rural, compared
to 9 percent for the school-based module and 4 percent for the in-service module.
PILEOT targets individuals who are self-employed or occupied in community-based
initiatives. Participants must have basic literacy and numeracy skills and be unem-
ployed or underemployed. The number of program participants has increased from
100,000 per year in the first years to 581,000 in 2000. Today PILEOT is the largest
module, covering more than half the participants; the school-based module is the
next largest; and the in-service module is the smallest.
The training gains from participation in PROBECAT may have been overesti-
mated in past evaluations. Two previous evaluations of PROBECAT have been per-
formed using data from 1992 and 1994 participants cohorts. These evaluations,
which where completed before the start of PILEOT, suggested that the program had
a positive impact on wages and that it reduced the time needed to find employment.
Thus, the benefits of the programs for participants surpassed its costs to the gov-
ernment. In both evaluations, the analysis relied on a quasi-experiment by compar-
ing a treatment group (the PROBECAT trainees) with a control group (the urban
unemployed). However, a reexamination of the more recent study using the same
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data but with alternative econometric methods suggests that the gains from
PROBECAT may have been overestimated. In this reexamination, the program does
not appear to have much impact on either employment or wages.
The weak impact of PROBECAT is not unlike that of other training programs
in OECD countries. The disappointing results of PROBECAT in terms of raising
wages and employment are not surprising. Most retraining programs in OECD
countries have been found to be of limited impact. When programs were found to
have an impact in the short term, this impact was also found to vanish after a few
years. As for PROBECAT, the results observed with the in-service modality in terms
of employment at the end of the program need not imply large net gains. It could
well be that without the wage subsidy provided by the government, participating
firms would have hired the same workers (this is referred to as a deadweight loss in
the literature) or other workers (substitution effect). It may even be that the firms
which benefited from the wage subsidies became more competitive, and thereby dis-
placed workers in other firms not benefiting from the subsidies (displacement
effect). In some OECD countries, the combined impact of deadweight losses, sub-
stitution, and displacement has been shown to wipe out up to 90 percent of the
effects of training and subsidy programs for the unemployed. While this does not
mean that PROBECAT should be terminated, it suggests that rigorous cost-benefit
analysis be applied to the program.
There may be a tension between the safety net and training components of
PROBECAT. One reason why PROBECAT has a limited impact on employment
and wages may be that the duration of training provided is too short (typically two
months) to provide skills valuable in the long term. PROBECAT may function
rather as a (well-targeted) safety-net program providing temporary relief for the
unemployed, with a self-targeting mechanism not unlike that of PET, since partici-
pants receive only the minimum wage. If this were the case, there would be a ten-
sion between the objectives of training and income supplementation, since the
means to achieve both are not necessarily the same. It is probably better to choose
one goal or the other, rather than trying to meet both goals with a single program.
On the other hand, even if PROBECAT were to better serve as a training program
during good times, it could still easily be transformed into a self-targeted and rela-
tively cost-effective safety net during recessions.
VI. Investments in the Physical Capital of Poor Areas
The government’s third and last group of programs for the poor deals with the social
infrastructure of poor areas. The government programs reviewed in the last two sec-
tions are implemented primarily at the household level (PET is an exception in that
it affects both households and communities, the latter through public works). But
the standard of living of households is not determined only by household charac-
teristics; it also depends on the characteristics of the areas in which households live.
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The last group of poverty programs aims at improving the social infrastructure of
poor communities. The problems confronted in rural and urban areas are different.
In rural areas, there is a lack of basic social infrastructure such as schools and health
centers. In urban areas, basic social services are more accessible, but migration cre-
ates settlements in which housing conditions are deplorable. In addition, due to the
decentralization process, the funds for investments in the physical capital of mar-
ginalized areas are now provided by the federal entity to states, and then from states
to municipalities, which are ultimately accountable for their use. A new range of
issues related to decentralization emerges in the management of these programs.
Taking this into account, this section analyzes the infrastructure needs of the urban
and rural poor areas, and considers the decentralization process and its allocation
formulas for funds.
Most of the funding for investments in poor areas is disbursed through the
decentralized FAIS. FAIS, the Fondo de Aportaciones para la Infraestructura Social,
which provides federal funding to improve the basic social infrastructure of margin-
alized areas. The fund covers investments in both urban and rural areas for clean
water, sewerage, drainage, urbanization, electricity, basic education infrastructure,
basic health infrastructure, rural roads, and rural productive infrastructure. Of a
total of MXP$18.2 billion allocated to the physical capital of poor areas in 2000,
MXP$14.9 billion (82 percent) will be distributed through FAIS (Figure 12). Most
other programs for infrastructure in poor areas deal with water and sanitation
(through CNA), and rural ways and telephony (through SCT).
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Figure 12. Expenditure in Physical Capital in Poor Areas, 1998 and 1999
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Inadequate Access to Basic Social Infrastructure
The geographic effects on well-being provide a rationale for policies for poor areas.
In Mexico, there are large differences in standards of living between states, and
between municipalities within states. These differences could be due to differences
in the characteristics of the households living in various areas, such as education and
occupation. They could also be due, however, to the characteristics of the areas
themselves, such as infrastructure. More precisely, the characteristics of an area can
have both direct and indirect geographic effects on the well-being of its inhabitants.
• Direct Effects. By direct effects, it is meant that statistically significant geo-
graphic determinants of income or consumption are observed even after con-
trolling for a wide range of households characteristics. Differences between
areas in the returns to household characteristics can also be observed. These
direct geographic effects may be due to many causes, including climate, access
to markets, demand for labor, and industry concentration. Neoclassical the-
ory predicts that migration should reduce the size of these effects, but the
effects can persist for a long time.
• Indirect Effects. Apart from direct effects, there may also be indirect geographic
effects in that location may affect household endowments (such as education)
and opportunities (such as occupational choice), which themselves affect stan-
dards of living. For example, the availability of schools may affect education
levels, which are themselves a key household determinant of income.
According to estimates based on the INEGI surveys, there are indeed both direct
and indirect geographic effects at the state level on standards of living in Mexico. For
example, one can provide measures of mean per capita income by state without and
with controls for a wide range of household characteristics. This yields geographic
effects which are relatively stable over time and coherent with observed migration.
This provides some rationale for investing in the physical capital and social infra-
structure of poor areas, since area characteristics do matter for poverty reduction.
This is true in both urban and rural areas.
Part of the strong geographic effects on standards of living may be due to the fact
that small rural and marginalized communities lack access to a wide range of public
services. Table 5 provides statistics on the lack of access to public services in a sam-
ple of marginalized rural areas from the 1997 ENCASEH. In the group made up of
the smallest communities with less than 20 households, only 40 percent of the vil-
lages have electricity. Forty percent of the smallest villages still do not have a primary
school. Sewerage, public phones, and post offices are virtually nonexistent. A major-
ity of the smallest villages are served by mobile health units, but 30 percent are not.
Access to services improves with the size of the community, especially for schooling,
but even in the larger communities there are gaps, for example, in healthcare. All
this does not mean that a post office or a clinic should be placed in villages with less
GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS AND POVERTY 609
PP 569-616.rrd  4/4/01  2:00 PM  Page 609
than 20 households, but it points to the lack of access to basic services on the part
of the rural population.
Small communities also suffer from a lack of access to government programs. The
smaller the community, the smaller the likelihood of benefiting from government
programs as well (Table 6). DICONSA stores, which provide basic products at low
prices, are not located in the smallest villages because they are not a sufficient mar-
ket. The differences in access to DIF programs are smaller than those observed for
DICONSA but nevertheless there are differences. Grants from various ministries
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Table 5. Lack of Access to Public Services (Percent)
Community Size 
(Number of Households)
Up to 20 21 to 60 61/more
Electricity 59 40 20
Sewerage 90 87 84
Public phone 97 90 52
Post office 98 98 95
Preschool 68 28 6
Primary school 40 13 2
Telesecondary school 99 95 69
Secondary school 100 100 95
SSA clinic 98 93 76
IMSS–Solidaridad 100 98 90
Local health auxiliaries 72 47 41
Health mobile unit 30 25 25
Source: World Bank staff estimates.
Table 6. Lack of Access to Programs (Percent)
Community Size 
(Number of Households)
Up to 20 21 to 60 61/more
Diconsa store 97 86 52
DIF school breakfasts 46 42 38
DIF community kitchen 96 93 89
Liconsa distribution 95 92 84
Subsidized tortilla 99 99 98
Grants (depensas) 70 59 53
Niños de Solidaridad 63 50 41
PROBECAT and Cimo 99 99 98
Empleo temporal 94 90 84
Source: World Bank staff estimates. 
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and Niños de Solidaridad also have a hard time making it to the smallest communi-
ties, as is the case of PET. Thus, those communities which are likely to be the poor-
est remain excluded from the programs implemented by the government for the
reduction of extreme poverty. It should also be noted that PROGRESA is not reach-
ing the smallest communities because the existence of a health center and a school
are requirements for program participation at the community level. This is due to
the fact that the program is based on co-responsibility for the parents to send their
children to school and to visit the health center regularly. It would be worth inves-
tigating how to reach these communities (Ramo 33 gives the opportunity to states
and localities to build schools and health centers, and this could provide an oppor-
tunity for the extension of PROGRESA).
Access to services and programs in poor rural areas helps build human capital. The
impact of government services and programs on schooling and child labor in mar-
ginalized areas has been measured using the 1997 ENCASEH. Preliminary findings
indicate that DIF’s school breakfasts have some impact on child labor (reduced for
boys) and schooling (increased for girls) in marginalized areas, while Niños de Soli-
daridad apparently does not have as much impact. Moreover, access to telesecondary
school was found to increase the probability of going to school for both boys and girls
between ages 8 and 14. Many children aged 12 to 14 who have completed primary
school attend telesecondary school when it is available. It may also reflect a pulling
effect from telesecondary to primary as the perspective of being able to attend telesec-
ondary makes the expected benefits of completing the primary level more attractive.
Poor living conditions in rural areas have led to migration to urban areas and to
the U.S. Today, 7 million Mexicans live in the U.S. The total value of remittances
from international migration was estimated by the Central Bank at US$4.2 billion
in 1997. Remittances are equivalent to the total agricultural output of Mexico, 57
percent of its available foreign exchange, and 5 percent of the income from total
exports. Migration, both internal and international, can be seen as part of a port-
folio of activities that households engage in not only to combat poverty, but also to
alleviate risk. Migrant remittances protect rural households when they are con-
fronted with declining economic conditions and inflation. Remittances also coun-
teract seasonal cash-flow problems for farm households. Households with good
incomes may also migrate when access to credit is limited in their place of origin. In
some cases, remittances are used to invest in new business ventures or farming tech-
niques. Yet while migration may lead to an influx of funds, in the long term the
question arises as to whether it increases the options of migrant families or encour-
ages a dependent relationship with little prospect for change.
Migration is not without social costs, and it poses a difficult infrastructure chal-
lenge in cities. While migration may appear to result in the reduction of poverty
when measured through a standard index, it also generates high social costs. When
a father migrates, the mother and the children often stay in their village of origin.
Emphasis on the potential benefits from migration in economic terms may lead to
the exclusion of migration issues at the policy level. Rural–urban migration within
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Mexico is large, and during 1970–90 it contributed to an increase from 10 to 55 in
the number of medium-sized cities of 100,000 to 1 million inhabitants. Many of
these cities have problems providing sufficient employment and infrastructure for
their population. The living conditions of some urban migrants are deplorable, and
the cost of providing them with access to water, sewerage, and electricity is high.
These issues are worth thoroughly examining in the context of the links between
rural and urban poverty.
Good Institutions and Management are Needed for Decentralization to
Be Pro-poor
Traditionally, in Mexico, budgets and allocation decisions were centralized at the
federal level. Until recently, decisionmaking and social spending were centralized at
the federal level. Apart from local needs, it has been argued that political negotia-
tions and client-based relationships possibly played a role in budget allocations. For
example, in President Salinas’ (1988–94) PRONASOL, a large government pro-
gram which provided money for local infrastructure, funds were delivered directly
from the central government to local Solidarity committees, bypassing state and
municipal governments. The allocation of PRONASOL funds was probably not as
responsive to local needs as it could have been. The program favored urban areas
over rural areas despite the fact that rural areas were poorer. Even if the allocation
decisions were appropriate, however, a lack of transparency cast doubt on the pro-
gram’s management.
Recently, large funds including FAIS have been decentralized under Ramo 33.
Things changed in 1995 when the government announced institutional reforms
aimed at decentralizing public spending (Nuevo Federalismo). The aims of these
reforms are threefold: (a) to improve both financial and political accountability at the
local, regional, and national level; (b) to encourage the participation of local actors
and strengthen state–civil society interactions; and (c) to ensure that service provision
improves in poor and marginal areas. In 1996, as part of this plan, 60 percent of the
funds available through Ramo 26 were distributed to states through a public formula
and went into a municipal development fund (Fondo Del Desarollo Social Municipal,
FDSM). These funds were available for work in several areas: water and drainage,
urbanization, electrification, basic health infrastructure, basic education infrastruc-
ture, housing improvement, rural roadways, and productive rural infrastructure. In
1998, decentralization went further with Ramo 33, through which 82 percent of all
decentralized funds are now transferred. Ramo 33 incorporates funds previously avail-
able from FDSM into FAIS, but its scope has been widened to also incorporate funds
previously allocated through the Ministries of Health and Education. Apart from
FAIS, Ramo 33 consists of nine other funds: Fondo de Aportaciones para la Educación
Básica y Normal (FAEB), Fondo de Aportaciones para los Servicios de Salud (FASSA),
Fondo de Aportaciones para la Infraestructura Social (FAIS), Fondo para la Infraestruc-
tura Social Esatal (FISE), Fondo para la Infraestructura Social Municipal (FISM),
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Fondo de Aportaciones para el Fortalecimiento Municipal (FAFM), Fondo de Aporta-
ciones Múltiples (FAM), Fondo de Aportaciones para la Educación Tecnológica y de Adul-
tos (FAETA), and Fondo de Aportaciones para la Seguridad Pública (FASP).
Because of the speed with which decentralization took place, some management
issues remain. Mexico’s decentralization took place in part to ensure a more equi-
table and transparent distribution of federal resources. It was also motivated, how-
ever, by negotiations between political parties. Because of deadlines for adopting the
federal budget, decentralization was accelerated without giving much time to states
and municipalities to get ready for the exercise of their new responsibilities. Other
issues have not been resolved due to the speed with which decentralization took
place. While decentralization has virtues, it is not a panacea, and in particular it need
not be pro-poor, nor does it necessarily improve governance.
Allocations for existing social infrastructure continue to be based on past history
rather than need. The allocations for basic education (FAEB) and 80 percent of
health spending (FASSA), both of which account for three fourths of Ramo 33’s
budget, are based not on need, but on past expenditures and existing costs. The rest
of FASSA (20 percent) is allocated through a formula that takes into account state
deficits or surpluses in healthcare, but this still does not compensate fully for the
unequal distribution of services. There is thus inequity because states that are well
endowed continue to receive large portions of FAEB and FASSA funds. By contrast,
the six states that account for 46 percent of the illiterate receive only 33 percent of
FAEB (excluding the state of Mexico and the D.F.). Alternative formulas could pro-
vide more equity in the distribution of funds. In the case of education, this could
include (a) a uniform per-student formula, (b) a per-student formula adjusted to the
elasticity of enrollment by state (so that more money is given to lagging states whose
elasticity of enrollment to public spending is higher); or (c) a formula that would
include the above plus a provision to allocate supplementary funds to target children
with special needs such as rural, indigenous, or poor children. It should be men-
tioned, though, that apart from FAEB and FASSA, there are other programs (such
as CONAFE, INI, PROGRESA, INEA, and PAC) that directly aim at improving
services to the poor.
Allocations for new infrastructure (FAIS) are based on need and rely on a pub-
licly known formula. FAIS funds new social infrastructure projects mainly at the
municipal level. The allocation of FAIS funds from the federal entity to the states is
based on a weighted index of well-being called the Masa Carencial Municipal
(MCM). MCM takes into account five indicators of well-being: the household per
capita income (with a weight equal to 0.462), the average level of education per
household (0.125 weight), a measure of the living space (0.239 weight), a measure
of the availability of drainage (0.061 weight), and a measure of access to electric-
ity–fuel combustion (0.114 weight). MCM is calculated first at the household level,
then at the municipality level, and finally at the state level. The federal entity makes
the transfers to the states on the basis of the state-level aggregate MCM, then the
allocation is made from the state to the municipalities along similar lines. States
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which do not have the necessary information to apply the FAIS formula for their
allocations to municipalities may use a simpler rule based on the arithmetic mean of
the shares of the economically active population earning less than two minimum
wages, the adult illiterate population, the population living in houses without
drainage, and the population in houses without electricity. All but six states used this
simpler formula in 1998. To cushion smaller and richer states from their reduction
in infrastructure funding, 1 percent of FAIS was allocated to each state equally in
1998 (for a total of 31 percent of the budget). In 1999, each state received 0.5 per-
cent of the FAIS budget. Thereafter, only the formula will rule (Table 7).
The FAIS formula has increased infrastructure funding for the poorest states. Fig-
ure 13 give the expected allocation of FAIS funding in 2000 as a function of a sim-
plified measure of well-being at the state level. The use of need-based formulas to
distribute the funds is clearly redistributive. The six poorest states have increased
their share of these transfers from 29 percent in 1988 to 49 percent in 1999. In
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Table 7. Allocation Rules for the Main Social Spending Funds in Ramo 33
Fund Objective of the Fund Allocation Criteria
FAEB
FASSA
FAIS
Source: Government of Mexico.
Covers the cost of basic
education in states, includ-
ing personnel salaries
(88 percent of total costs),
running costs, and general
investments (except
infrastructure).
Covers the cost of existing
infrastructure for basic
healthcare in states.
Covers basic infrastructure,
including clean water, sew-
erage, drainage, urbaniza-
tion, electricity, basic educa-
tion infrastructure, basic
health infrastructure, rural
roads, and rural productive
infrastructure.
The budget is allocated by the Ministry of
Education (SEP) on the basis of past invest-
ments and costs, thereby showing inertia
from year to year and little adaptation to
local needs. 
80 percent of the budget is allocated by the
Ministry of Health to cover the costs of the
existing infrastructure. The rest (20 percent)
is allocated through a formula taking into
account a minimal level of health expendi-
tures per capita, and indicators such as the
mortality rate, the uninsured population,
and the state’s marginalization index.
Funds are allocated according to needs as
measured by a weighted index of five indi-
cators of standards of living (illiteracy,
drainage, electricity, water, and income).
For the first two years, part of the funds are
split equally between states to provide a
cushion for richer states.
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2000, with the elimination of the fixed 0.5 percent share provision, this share will
further increase to 54 percent. While the FAIS formula could perhaps be improved
by finding a better way to define the weights of the five indicators on the basis of
their elasticities of substitution, the current formulas are probably good enough.
Additional relevant household-level information (such as direct measures of access
to education and health facilities) could be incorporated into the formula, but for
policy purposes, the allocation between states would not be affected much because
the various indicators are highly correlated with each other. What is more important
is to find mechanisms to monitor the allocation of funds within municipalities.
The decision to apply similar formulas for the allocation within states is sound.
The majority (90 percent) of FAIS funds are transferred to a municipal fund
(FISM). The rest (10 percent of the FAIS budget) goes into a state municipal fund.
This 90/10 repartition is intended to promote responsiveness to local needs and pri-
orities. Moreover, as of 1998, the FAIS formula (or its simpler equivalent) must be
used for the allocation of funds between municipalities to ensure redistribution
within states and between states. The experience of 1997, during which states could
allocate their funds to municipalities as they wished, shows that the imposition of
federal rules for within-state allocations may be needed. In the states of Guerrero
and Tlaxcala the allocations between municipalities in 1997 were almost uniform,
without regard for the relative state of deprivation of the municipalities. The changes
made to the law for fiscal coordination in 1999 should help ensure that FAIS
resources go to poor communities.
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Figure 13. FAIS Allocations in 2000
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VIII. Conclusion
The challenge ahead is to design appropriate institutional management and control
mechanisms. Confusion between state and federal responsibilities for the control of
the use of FAIS funds has led to problems of accountability. There have also been a
number of other administrative issues that will need to be resolved. For example,
originally, the calendar of distribution for the funds had been so uncertain that
municipal governments had not been able to take full advantage of their new
resources to start projects Moreover, while the allocation rules for the funds are clear,
in principle, some municipalities still remain uninformed as to their new budget.
Many of these problems have been solved, and the calendar for the distribution of
funds is now officially published.
While some of these problems may be temporary, they are a warning to advocates
of devolution who automatically cite its benefits. At the micro level, devolution may
guarantee neither efficiency nor equity without appropriate institutions and control
mechanisms. The problem is that many local governments lack the expertise and
personnel to manage the FAIS funds, and resources have not yet been made avail-
able to help them increase their operating budgets, hire new staff or train existing
staff, and modernize their administration. Another potential danger lies in the short-
term assignments in the local political system. Municipal elections are held every
three years and municipality presidents can serve for only one term, which may
imperil the continuity of the municipal policy. On the other hand, while longer
terms or reelection may improve stability, they can also create fiefdoms (caciquismo)
when there is no voice from civil society. Civil society has a role to play here in
ensuring that decentralization be pro-poor.
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